Underexposed 1: The raw materials front line shifts from Hormuz to Africa
Headlines:
- Military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are increasingly nationalizing mines and driving out Western multinationals, offering preferential deals to China and Russia.
- New legislation in the Sahel raises the state’s share in gold and some critical minerals to approximately 25–40%.
- Global concerns about supply chain risks for EV batteries and green tech are mounting, while African soil contains roughly 30% of the world’s critical reserves.
The facts: African governments are trying to keep a larger share of commodity revenues at home. In the Sahel, juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are taking over mines, arresting executives, and renegotiating contracts under the guise of “economic sovereignty.” This follows anti-Western sentiment after various coups and support from Russia and China. Mali increased the potential state and local participation in new projects to 35%. Burkina Faso nationalized gold mines and announced plans to bring more industrial mines under state control. In Niger, the conflict with the French company Orano escalated into a battle over uranium, ownership, and sovereignty. Outside the Sahel, the same pattern is visible: the DRC imposed an export ban on cobalt in 2025 and subsequently switched to quotas; Zimbabwe suspended the export of raw minerals and lithium concentrates; Namibia is pushing for an export ban on unprocessed critical minerals. The underlying goal is similar in all these cases: less “dig-and-ship,” more tax revenue, more local processing, and greater political control over strategic assets.
This trend is fueled by a structural shift in power. The energy transition, higher defense spending, and investments in AI hardware are increasing demand for cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite, manganese, and rare earth metals, among others. A large portion of the reserves and production of these raw materials is geographically concentrated in Africa, among other regions. According to some estimates, for example, the DRC accounts for 70% of global cobalt production, and South Africa holds by far the largest share of manganese, often estimated at more than half of global reserves. This gives African states greater bargaining power than during previous commodity cycles and is driving efforts to rewrite contracts, royalties, export rules, and value-addition requirements. S&P Global and Grant Thornton, among others, warn that this will lead to higher prices, delays, and the relocation of supply chains. The trend is not new, but it is accelerating due to global demand for critical raw materials.
The weighting: The global economy is beginning to feel two vulnerabilities at once: the “old” dependence on fossil fuel and the new dependence on materials. The Iran crisis highlights the first vulnerability in its raw form. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped by approximately 90% since the start of the war, while oil prices have surged; with a significant risk of higher inflation and weaker growth. This is precisely why the bridge to Africa is becoming important. A new oil crisis strengthens the incentive to accelerate electrification, become more sustainable, and “friend-source” supply chains. This acceleration also increases the strategic value of African minerals and other commodities. In other words: the harder the world tries to escape its vulnerability to fossil fuels, the faster it finds itself in a new relationship of dependency with resource-producing states. This makes resource nationalism in Africa not a marginal phenomenon, but one of the central geopolitical risks of the coming years. The most likely scenario is not a sudden global shortage of all critical minerals, but a world of higher risk premiums, more export restrictions, greater competition for raw materials, and more political conditions surrounding access to reserves, refining, and infrastructure.
Resource nationalism is not a temporary blip, but a continental renegotiation of the terms under which the world gains access to the materials of the energy transition. The Iran crisis underscores why this matters now: the global economy is learning simultaneously that fossil fuel chokepoints have not yet disappeared and that the way out runs through a new set of mineral chokepoints.
Underexposed 2: The Lithium Triangle
Headlines:
- The so-called Lithium Triangle is evolving in three directions: Chile is opting for state-led joint ventures, Bolivia is expanding a state-driven model with Chinese and Russian partners, while Argentina is focusing on investor-friendly policies that offer long-term certainty.
- The biggest bottleneck is political, not geological: elections, social unrest, and policy uncertainty are slowing down lithium and copper projects.
The facts: It is not only Africa that is increasingly rewriting the terms surrounding raw materials; in Latin America, too, they are busy drafting a new chapter on raw materials. The Lithium Triangle—Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile—contains more than half of the estimated global lithium reserves. At the same time, Chile and Peru together account for about one-third of global copper production. This makes the region crucial for batteries, power grids, and the broader electrification of the economy.
Chile is moving toward a model in which the state takes the lead without excluding private investors. In strategic salt flats, the government wants control or a majority stake. But the election cycle creates uncertainty about the continuity of this policy.
Bolivia has opted for a more state-centric model. Through the state-owned company YLB, the country is attempting to accelerate lithium industrialization with support from Chinese and Russian partners. This course is politically sensitive and slows down decision-making.
Argentina positions itself as a counterpoint. With the so-called RIGI regime, it offers long-term fiscal stability to attract investment. This currently makes it the most accessible market, though macroeconomic and political risks remain significant given President Javier Milei’s governing style.
In Peru, protests and blockades demonstrate how vulnerable the copper supply chain is. For the energy transition, this is at least as important as lithium: without copper, there can be no further electrification.
The weighting: The war and the disruption around the Strait of Hormuz remind the world how vulnerable it still is to classic energy shockwaves. At the same time, it is precisely such an oil and security crisis that is forcing companies and governments to move faster and more decisively toward electrification, strategic stockpiles, and reduced dependence on a single region or supplier. This automatically increases the importance of lithium and copper—and thus of South America. But vulnerability lurks there as well: higher political risk premiums, greater state interference, more difficult permitting processes, and increased geopolitical competition for access.
The green economy is not inherently safer than the fossil fuel economy. It primarily shifts toward other dependencies. Anyone who looks only to the Middle East for energy risk is missing something fundamental. The costs and risks of the energy transition are just as much determined in Santiago, La Paz, Buenos Aires, and Lima—through contract terms, export regimes, social conflicts, and the question of which states are willing to sell their raw materials, at what price, and under what political conditions.
Underexposed 3: Demolition Ball Donald vs. Chess Grandmaster Xi
Headlines:
- Trump and Xi Jinping will meet on May 14–15 in Beijing. The summit, previously postponed due to the Iran conflict, has been definitively confirmed.
- The summit is not about a “reset,” but about managing rivalry over tariffs, export controls, critical minerals, agriculture, and investment rules.
- Xi will also visit Washington later this year.
The facts: The original schedule for the U.S.-China summit at the end of March was postponed because Trump wanted to remain in Washington to manage the escalating tensions surrounding Iran. The meeting in Beijing on May 14–15 is more than just a diplomatic interlude: it is a potential turning point in the relationship between the world’s two largest economies. The summit will be the stage on which Washington and Beijing attempt to recalibrate the rules of the game for how the two superpowers interact with each other and the world.
During the preparatory talks in Paris (March 15–16), Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Vice Premier He Lifeng discussed, among other things, additional Chinese purchases of U.S. agricultural products, improved access to critical Chinese minerals, and new governance mechanisms for trade and investment, including a potential U.S.-China Board of Trade and Board of Investment. However, in parallel with the Paris rapprochement, the U.S. launched new Section 301 investigations on March 11 into structural overcapacity in sectors such as automobiles, batteries, semiconductors, shipbuilding, and solar energy—with China prominently in the picture. Public hearings will begin on May 5.
For Beijing, the summit comes at a sensitive time. China has set a growth target of 4.5–5% for 2026, lower than in previous years. This increases the need for external predictability, especially now that exports, investments, and industrial competition are becoming increasingly politicized.
The weighting: While the war in the Middle East is currently affecting oil prices and supply chains, the Beijing summit may help lay the groundwork for the rules governing geopolitical relations, global trade, commodity flows, and industrial competition in the coming years. But the Beijing summit will not yield a major historic agreement for the history books. The question is whether Washington and Beijing can temporarily channel their rivalry. Trump is seeking tangible deals and quick political gains in the areas of agriculture, critical minerals, market access, and stability for markets and supply chains. Xi is aiming for stability, time, and breathing room: less escalation, less pressure on China’s growth engine, and more control over the pace of strategic competition.
Take a look at my latest Global Political Analysis: Will the Iranian tanker sink the global economy?
